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SIGLER- BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
I. 
A. 
Appeal from jury verdicts in district court: appeal denial ofIdaho Criminal Rule 35 
Request for Reconsideration of Sentence. 
B. Procedural Historv 
The appellant was charged with eight felony counts, indicted by the grand jury on C01mt I., 
POSSESSION OF SEXUALLY EXPLOITATIVE MATERIAL, FELONY, Counts 11.- VII., 
SEXUAL BATTERY OF A MINOR CHILD SLXTEEN OR SEVENTEEN YEARS OF AGE, 
FELONY, (SIX C01.JNTS), and VIII. PROCUREMENT, FELONY, and entered pleas of "not 
guilty" in district court. The district court presided over the four day jury trial. The jury found 
the appellant "guilty" on Count 1. 1 and Count II?, "not guilty" on nvo counts, and deadlocked on 
the remaining four counts. state declined to pursue the four counts on which the jury was 
unable to reach a verdict. A PSI and psychosexual evaluation were prepared. At the time of 
sentencing, the Court imposed a 5 & 5 (10) on Count I, a concurrentlO &10 (20) on Count II, 
imposed a $5,000 fine, and retained jurisdiction. At the end of the retained jurisdiction, the 
Court placed the appellant on probation for a period of 20 years. A timely Notice of Appeal was 
filed. Thereafter, a timely Idaho Criminal Rule, (hereafter "ICR"), 35 Motion to reduce sentence 
was filed, briefed, and denied by the district court. The Notice of Appeal was amended to 
include the denial of the ICR 35 Motion. This brief follows in support follows. 
I Possession of pictures depicting BC in various states of dress. 
2 Sexual battery by making photographic recording, (sic), of a minor. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
The appellant was the OVvTIer &'1d stock holder of a computer sales and service 
company in Boise, Idaho. During the summer 2007, the appellant and one of his employees 
were eating a local fast food restaurant and noticed that one of the vv-orkers, (the victim in this 
case, hereafter "Be'), at the restaurant appeared to be a conscientious and fast worker. The 
appellant gave the employee one of his business cards and suggested that she call about ajob at 
his company. BC contacted the appellant the next day and was hired to scan a back log of 
documents onto an electronic backup storage system, and assist other employees of the company 
when needed. 
BC purchased a digital camera from a local retail store, and took the camera to work. Be 
used this camera to take pictures of various employees, and requested that the employees take 
pictures of her. BC requested that the appellant take pictures of her to show to her boyfriend, the 
appellant acquiesced, and pictures were taken for this purpose on two occasions. After 
appellant took these pictures, he returned the camera to Be, and Be transferred the pictures by 
way of a digital camera card to her company issued computer that is connected to the company 
back-up system. 
Be became pregnant while working at the company, and the appellant was not the father of 
the child. Be stole approximately three thousand dollars from the company safe, was 
confronted by the appellant, and returned a portion of the money. Be used a company credit to 
make unauthorized purchases, was confronted, and acknowledged these thefts. BC stole a 
laptop computer from the company, surreptitiously returned the computer after being questioned 
by the appellant, and then admitted to the theft after being confronted with a surveillance video 
that revealed her returning the computer. Be was fired as a result of the computer theft. After 
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being terminated, BC returned to the business on a regular to employees her new born 
child. During time period, BC 'vvas paid to the in the ne,v facility where the 
business had moved. 
II. ISSCES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the appellant denied a fair trial by the state's frequent and ongoing violations of the rules 
of evidence evenmally reaching the level of pro secutori al misconduct? 
2. Did the District Court err not granting the appellant's motion for a mistrial? 
3. Did the District Court err in not granting the appellant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to ICR 
29? 
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by not reducing the appellant's sentence on Count II 
pursuant to ICR 35? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The appellant was denied a fair trial bv the state's frequent and ongoing violations of the rules 
of evidence which eventuallv reached the level of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The appellant made one hundred and fifteen (115) objections3 during the state's 
presentation of evidence and cross examination, eighty-one, (81), of the objections were 
sustained,4 and in approximately four (4) instances it was not possible to tell from the record 
how the judge ruled. 5 When the district court did not rule on some of the objections, it 
3 Appellant's approximation from review of the record, examining the Court Reporter's index of 
words using "object", (p 112- 113), "objections", (p 113), and "objects", (p 113). Appellant 
further argues that the Court ruled erroneously on many of the objections that were over ruled. 
Eg.: Appellant objected to hearsay when state's witness Kristina Bowins informed the jury that 
the "bartender at "Backstreet Billiards", (not called as a witness), told the witness, "That she had, 
you know, basically taken some money out of the till and he found out. And in return for not 
turning her in to the police, there were sexual favors done.", (JT Tr p 278 through p 281). These 
statements constitute hearsay, are highly prejudicial in that the only testimony presented by the 
state that the appellant and BC had sex was from Be. 
4 See Footnote 3, (supra). 
5 In contrast, the state made twenty-three, (23), objections, with nine, (9), being sustained. 
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admonished the prosecutors, and/or instmcted said prosecutors on to properly introduce the 
evidence to the jury. 
the mling in State v Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010),6 a defendant in a criminal case has 
the added burden of making a contemporaneous objection to every potential evidentiary' error 
made by the state at jury trial or the issue is not preserved for review unless said error meets the 
criteria as set out in Perry, (supra). Appellant argues that ajury could perceive counsel's 
objections as attempts to keep harmfitl information from the jury' or delay the process. Juries are 
not and cannot be privy to the rationale behind the Court's mlings and could \vrongly speculate 
as to why the Court mled the way it did. The jury instmction addressing mlings and speculation 
about said mlings is not sufficient in a case like this where the trial lasts four days and there are 
over one hundred objections by the appellant. 
At some point, the state's incompetence in attempting to present evidence violates a 
defendant's right to due process and a fair triaL state has an affirmative duty to do justice by 
presenting their case in a manner that does not force the appellant to make endless and repetitive 
objections. 
The judge's role is that of neutral arbiter and it violates the appellant's right to due process 
and arguably assists the state in presenting their case when the judge instructs the state on how to 
introduce evidence and elicit testimony from a witness without violating the rules of evidence. 
6 In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the 
fundamental error doctrine as it applies to allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. If the alleged 
misconduct was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, an appellate court should reverse 
when the defendant persuades the court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more ofthe 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) is clear or obvious without the need for reference 
to any additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings.ld. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
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During direct examination of a state's v,'imess, the Court sustains an obj ection, admonishes 
the prosecutor to "ask open-ended, not leading questions. ahead.", at the 
prosecutor asks for guidance, and Court has to further instruct "You should ask him \vhat he 
knows about that. I am not going to tell you hov,' to conduct your examination. Counsel. I am 
saying the question as I heard it to this witness was leading.", I rial transcript (hereafter 
"JI Ir') p 459, 11 5-25). Ihe transcript is rife with examples of the Court instructing the state 
how to present their case. 7 
Once again, these repeated and ongoing actions by the state eventually reach the level of 
prosecutorial misconduct. State v Grantham, 146 Idaho 390, (2008), holds as follows: 
"\Vhile our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is 
expected to be diligent and leave no stone untumed, he is nevertheless expected and required 
to be fair. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571,165 P.Jd 273, 285 (2007). Hovvever, in 
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct we must keep in mind the realities of trial. 
Id. A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial. Id. When there is no contemporaneous 
objection, a conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is 
sufficiently egregious so as to result in fundamental error. Jd. Fundamental error is an error 
that goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights. See State v. Christiansen, 144 
Idaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007). However, even when prosecutorial misconduct 
has resulted in fundamental error, the conviction will not be reversed when that error is 
harmless. Field, 144 Idaho at 571, 165 P .3d at 285. Ihe test for whether prosecutorial 
misconduct constitutes harmless error is whether the appellate court can conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the result of the trial would not have been different absent the 
misconduct. State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 368, 972 P.2d 737, 746 (Ct.App.1998)." 
In the present case, the jury acquitted on two felonies, hung on four, and found the appellant 
guilty on two. This incessant and ongoing misconduct by the state cannot be seen as harmless 
7 State's witness Kelly Johnson attempts to tell the jury something that BC told the appellant, an 
objection was made and sustained, the prosecutor then improperly argues in front of the jury, the 
Court is forced to explain the elementary concept of hearsay and re-affirm its ruling, the 
prosecutor makes an improper offer of proof in front of the jury, and the Court again re-affirms 
its ruling, OT Tr p 592, 11 2-22). (Appellant did not count the two subsequent re-affirmations in 
the totals in Footnote 3). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page 7 of 16 
enor. 
The appellant reiterates all arguments in Issues 2 and 3 in support of this issue. 
The District Court ened bv not 2:rantin2: the appellant's motion for a mistrial. 
During the investigation. enforcement officers found pictures of the appellant's wife 
wearing lingerie and various states of dress on computers seized from the company. The 
state wanted to introduce these pictures to show that certain witnesses saw these pictures at the 
same time said witnesses saw the pictures ofBC- essentially for purposes of establishing time 
frames of reference. The appellant objected, and the Court ruled that the witnesses could testifY 
about the pictures for purposes of establishing time frames, but no testimony about the 
appellant's \\ife being nude in the photographs, (JT Tr p 431, 11 9-20). The prosecutor stated 
that subsequent witnesses would be admonished about the Court's ruling, (JT Tr p 432, 1114-
18). 
The appellate review criteria for granting a mistrial is stated in State v Grantham, (supra), at 
page 498, which states the applicable considerations: 
"[TJhe question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his 
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the 
question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented 
reversible enor when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for 
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. 
The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible enor. Our focus is upon the 
continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial 
judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed 
retrospectively, constituted reversible enor." 
The prosecutor asked state's witness Todd Vandehey, "Okay, And when you were in his 
office, what photographs do you remember Mr. Sigler showing you?", to which Mr. Vandehey 
responded, "Photographs of his wife in a negligee"., (JT Tr p 517, 11 11-14). The appellant 
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objected, the Court sustained objection, at which time the appellant requested to take up a 
matter outside the jury's presence. 
The appellant then requested a mistrial, TRp 519, 11 The state then established 
that the prosecutor had discussed the issue of mentioning compromising photographs of the 
appellant's \vife with Vandehey, but he, "misunderstood the negligee", (JT Tr p 520, 11 13). 
The first reason the Court should have granted the mistrial is that this evidence of the 
appellant showing pictures of his \vife to other males is highly prejudicial, particularly in light of 
the fact appellant was charged with showing pictures of an underage female to other males. The 
logical conclusion the jury would draw is that if the appellant would violate his wife's trust and 
privacy, he would also violate the law. It is telling that the two counts on which the jury found 
the appellant guilty involved showing pictures to others. This factor alone is suffIcient to grant a 
mistrial under the reversible error analysis in Grantham, (supra). 
The second reason the Court should have granted a mistrial is state had a duty to 
make the Court's ruling clear to its witnesses; this ruling does not involve difficult concepts. 
The prosecutor went so far as to ask the Court for permission to lead the witness in order to 
abide by the Court's ruling, (JT Tr p528, 1115-23). The state did not lay the proper foundation 
for the use ofleading questions as the 'witnesses were adults, not hostile to the state, and of 
above average intelligence. The Court has discretion under Idaho Rule of Evidence, (hereafter 
"IRE"), 611 (c), but this was clearly abuse of that discretion. Permission should not have been 
granted by the Court. 8 
8 Appellant's attorney acquiesced to the use ofleading questions, but it is important to note that 
the judge had already ruled leading questions would be allowed, (1T Tr p 528, 11 15-19). 
Appellant fmiher argues that it obvious from the record up to this point that opposing the use of 
leading questions on this issue could lead to more immediate problems as the state had not been 
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The third reason the Court should have granted a mistrial is that this error was compounded 
due to the fact that this witness had never seen the pictures that testified about, ((JT p 522, 
111-5: p 523,1110-25 through p 524, 11 1-18). This witness "vas not competent to testify about 
these pictures, and in addition, the state should have known before asking the question he had 
never seen them. 
The issues in this case are similar to the issues in State v A1cAfurry, 143 Idaho 312, 143 P.3d 
400 (Ct of App. 2006). In ,\;fcMuny, the prosecutor improperly conunented in closing how the 
state's evidence had been un-rebutted when the defenda..l1t was the only person that could have 
re-butted said evidence. Two common factors in the present case are: 1- That there was a 
mistake by the prosecutor, (not properly instructing the \vitnesses concerning the judge's order, 
asking a question that the prosecutor should have known would elicit the answer received, and 
asking the question of an incompetent witness); and 2- The result of this mistake was the 
violation of "specific ruling", (JT Tr p 524, 11 the Court that was highly prejudicial to the 
appellant to the point the Court decided not to give a curative instruction as it would call more 
attention to the issue, (JT Tr p 528, 114-6). 
The appellant reiterates all arguments in this Issue 1 and 3 in support of this issue. 
C. The District Court erred in not grantin!l the appellant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to ICR 
29. 
At the close of the state's evidence, the appellants made an ICR 29 Motion to dismiss in the 
form of a brief and by oral motion, (JT Tr p 1042 through plOSS). 
State v Printz, 115 Idaho 566, 768 P.2d 829 (Id App. 1989), lists the criteria for ICR 29: 
"Under LC.R. 29(a), a judgment of acquittal shall be entered if the evidence is 
able to properly place evidence before the jury without "guidance" from the appellant by way of 
objections and "advice" from the Court when sustaining said objections. 
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insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense charged. Review of a denial of a motion for 
judgment of acquittal requires the appellate court to independently consider the evidence in the 
record and determine 'whether a reasonable mind would conclude that the defendant's guilt as to 
each material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Envin, 
Idaho 6, _ P (1977). In making this determination, all reasonable inferences are taken 
v. O/Campo, P 5 (Ct.App.1982)." 
Appellant will address Counts I and II sequentially. 
Count I 
Count I in the Indictment cites Idaho Code, (hereafter "IC"), sections 18-1507 and 
1507 A, with the language of, "posing in a sexually provocative manner, and exposing her bare 
breasts". IC 18-1507A defines the conduct as knowingly and willfully having possession of any 
sexually exploitative material as defined in IC 18-1507. The definition of "sexually exploitative 
material" in IC 18-1507(2)(k) is as follows: "Sexually exploitative material" means any 
photograph, ... or other electronically, ... reproduced visual material which depicts a child 
participating in, observing, or being used for explicit sexual conduct." "Explicit sexual conduct" 
is defined in IC 18-1507(2)(f): "means sexual intercourse, erotic fondling, erotic nudity, 
masturbation, sadomasochism, sexual excitement, or bestiality." 
BC purchased the camera and took it to work. Be's testimony was that she had informed 
the appellant she was in need of money, and the appellant offered to take pictures, (JT Tr p 735, 
1113-21). The state's case failed as to Count I in that none of the factors under IC 18-1507(2)(f) 
were proven or established by the state. There was no evidence of sexual intercourse; the only 
evidence of sexual touching was the consensual oral genital contact that occurred after BC was 
eighteen years of age. There was no evidence or testimony about erotic fondling associated with 
Count I, possession of exploitative material. There was no evidence of masturbation, 
sadomasochism, sexual excitement, or bestiality. 
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only remaining disjunctive listed under IC 18-1507(2)(f) is erotic nudity. 
I should not have been nudity is defined in State 
140 Idaho 235, 91 P.3d, 1139 
is defined. in relevant part, to mean the display of the human male or 
female genitals or pubic area, the undeveloped or developing genitals or pubic area of the human 
male or female child, the human female breasts, or the undeveloped or developing breast area of 
the human female child, for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or 
stimulation of one or more of the persons involved. I.C. § 18-1507(2)( e). The policy rationale 
behind the enactment ofthis statute is to "protect children from the physical and psychological 
damage caused by their being used in photographic representations of sexual conduct which 
involves children." I.c. § lS-1507A(l)." 
The testimony from BC was that appellant told her what to do and how to pose when 
taking the pictures. If the jury deemed this testimony to be credible, the elements of erotic nudity 
are not present. There was absolutely no evidence or testimony that these pictures were taken or 
utilized to arouse, stimulate, or sexually gratify BC or the appellant. 
Count II 
IC lS-1508A reads as follows pertinent part: 
"1) It is a felony for any person at least five (5) years of age older than a minor child who is 
sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, who, with the intent of arousing, appealing to or 
gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of such person, minor child, or third party, to: 
(d) Make any photographic or electronic recording of such minor child." 
The charging language in the Indictment reads in pertinent part, " ... did commit Sexual 
Battery by making photographic recording, (sic), of a minor, B.C., of the age of sixteen or 
seventeen years, with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of the defendant, ... " 
Once again, Count II should not have gone to the jury as the state presented absolutely no 
evidence that these pictures were taken to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or passion of the 
appellant, BC, or anyone else. 
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The appellant reiterates arguments in Issues 1 and 2 in support this issue. 
D. The District Court abused its discretion bv not reducinQ the appellant's sentence on Count II 
pursuant to ICR 35. 
The appellant requests this Court to review the Al\'fENDED IN 
SUPPORT OF I.c.R. 35 attachments), filed District Court on August 16,2012, 
and made part of the record in this case in the MOTION TO AUGMENT filed on September 7, 
2012. 
The case law and criteria for a reduction of sentence pursuant to ICR 35 is well settled 
and voluminous, as is the criteria for review of a denial by the appellate court, so appellant is 
citing the only case discovered \vhere an abuse of discretion \vas found, State v Carrasco, 114 
Idaho 348,757 P.2d, 211 (CtApp. 190), where the court held: 
also contends that, under the circumstances, the judge abused his discretion by 
pronouncing a thirty-year indetenninate sentence and by declining to reduce the sentence when 
requested to do so pursuant to LC.R. 35. Both the length of a sentence and the decision whether 
to reduce a sentence rest in the sound discretion of the sentencing court. See State v. Lopez, 106 
Idaho 447, P.2d (Ct.App.1984); State v. Toohill. 103 565,650 P.2d 707 
(Ct.App.1982). could have been sentenced to a maximum tenn of life in prison for 
delivery of these substances. I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a 
sentence or a decision to deny reduction will not be disturbed if the sentence imposed is within 
the maximum period allowed by statute as punishment for the particular crime. State v. Araiza, 
109 Idaho 188, 706 P .2d 77 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Toohill, supra. Our scope of review includes 
all infonnation submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on 
the motion to reduce. State v. Araiza, supra. 
Wilen reviewing indetenninate sentences, absent a contrary indication, we deem the length 
of confinement to be one-third of the face amount of the sentence. 
[757 P.2d 215J [114 Idaho 352] See State v. Toohill, supra. Therefore, for purposes of appellate 
review the length of confinement in the instant case is treated as ten years. In T oohill, we 
explained that a term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary at the time 
of sentencing to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all 
of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. A sentence longer than necessary 
for these purposes is unreasonable and may represent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. These 
criteria also apply to rulings on motions to reduce sentences under Rule 35. State v. Lopez, 
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supra. 
The appellant in this case was placed on probation after a retained jurisdiction as opposed 
to imposition of the sentence at the time of sentencing in Carrasco, ( supra), but the facts of the 
case and the reasoning of the Carrasco court are somewhat comparable. 
The appellant had an absolutely clean record prior to these convictions. The two counts 
which he was convicted did not involve any physical touching ofBC. The Court of Appeals 
in Carrasco noted that the defendant brought 1\\'0 pounds of heroin and two pounds of cocaine 
into the community around Rexberg, Idaho. These amounts of these two dangerous and 
addictive drugs could have had a devastating effect on this somewhat serene and peaceable 
region of the state, but the Court still reduced the sentence form thirty years to twenty years under 
the criteria in ICR 35. In the present case, the appellant's actions had a devastating impact on 
BC, but the conduct for which he was convicted does not warrant a twenty year probationary 
period. 
The appellant contends the sentence pronounced by the District Court was an abuse of 
discretion, as was the denial of the ICR 35. 
State v j\1artinez, 113 Idaho 535, 746 P.2d 994 (1987) holds as follows: 
"An LC.R. 35 motion to reduce sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, and a decision 
thereon is vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing court, State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho 
627,550 P.2d 130 (1976), and the motion may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was 
for any reason unduly severe. State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P .2d 869 (CLApp.l984); State 
v. Sutton, 106 Idaho .:+03,679 P.2d 680 (Ct.App.1984). An LC.R. 35 motion places on the 
movant the burden of showing that the original sentence was unduly severe. On appeal the 
appellant also bears the burden of presenting a sufficient record to evaluate the merits of the 
challenge of a discretionary decision related to sentencing. State v. Wolf, 102 Idaho 789, 640 P .2d 
1190 (Ct.App.1982). See also State v. Dusenbery, 109 Idaho 730, 710 P.2d 640 (Ct.App.l985)." 
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The District Court made some disturbing statements during the pronouncement of the 
sentence. The Court noted that "there is a temptation, I think, to sentence a defendant 
not based upon the guilty vvhat the defendant has been 
charged \vith.". (Sentencing Hearing transcript that has been placed in appellant's materials after 
the jury trial transcript so a jury trial citation be used, (JT Tr p 1338,11 5-9). appellant 
argues that the District Judge proceeded to sentence the appellant taking into consideration the 
dismissed charges. The Court pointed out that the defendant was not acquitted on four of the 
felonies; the jury \vas unable to reach a verdict, (IT Tr p 1338,1110-16). Appellant argues that 
the Court can only sentence a defendant for the crimes he \X/as found guilty, crimes that the jury 
hung on and that were ultimately dismissed are of no consequence and should not have been 
mentioned by the Court. 
The Court further improperly speculates about theses dismissed charges as evidenced by 
the anecdotal conjectures concerning other cases with hung juries to the point of essentially 
determining that there was a 70 to 80 percent chance the appellant would be found guilty at a 
subsequent trial, (JT Tr p 1338, II 10-24). Once again, the dismissed charges should not have 
been considered in any way by the Court. The Court goes on to hypothesize about the dismissed 
charges once again and states, "Obviously, some were in favor of finding the defendant guilty, 
and some were in favor of acquitting the defendant and they could not reach an agreement. .. So 
we don't know whether they were closer to acquittal of they were closer to guilty.", (IT Tr p 
1342,1121-25, through p 1343,111-7). The Court's decision to sentence the appellant to twenty 
years was definitely influenced by the speculation about the four Counts upon which the jury 
hung. 
APPELLANT'S BRlEF Page 15 of 16 
CONCLUSION 
F or the reasons set forth in this and based on all materials in the case file, the appellant 
requests this Court to vacate the Judgments Conviction and remand this case for a new 
In the alternative, the appellant requests this Court to find that the District Court abused its 
discretion in not granting the appellant's ICR 35 and reduce Count II to a aggregate ten year 
sentence of five years plus five years, concurrent with Count 1. 
DATED This ~ day Of~ , 2012. ~ __ _ 
/------;L~ 
DAVID 1. 3tiETHERS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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